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s 20784 CONGRESSION AL RECORD- SENATE Dece1~~ber 19, 1970 
vised, I believe to face frankly the reality 
that there is more to bringing about an 
end to our involvement in Indochina. 
than the removal of a. substantial part 
of our expeditionary forces from Viet-
nam-a step which I do not deprecate 
·but commend in every way. The fact is, 
l1owever, that what we are dealing with 
ii; hydra-headed. While the drawndown 
of U.S. ground forces has helped to re-
·quce casualties in one area, the other 
eittrapments have tightened their hold 
u)Jon this Nation. 
· I would hope the Senate, therefore, in 
the closing days of the expiring Congress, 
in )l time of haste and weariness, will 
no(have acted in a fashion which lends 
encouragement or support in any way, 
shape, or form to a deepening of this 
tragrdy which has already done so much 
to e!·ode the foundations of the Nation's 
unity and stabl!ity. 
I Would hope, too, that the President in 
his Continuing search for a responsible 
settlement, might oonsider directing 
that a pointed effort be made to seek 
new ingresses to a. peaceful solution 
either \11 Paris or elsewhere. It seems to 
me tha~ the executive branch might try 
to concentrate its negotiating attention 
a.t this time in an effort to determine 
whether the release of all U.S. prisoners 
of war might not better be secured as a 
quid pro quo, if we were prepared to set 
forth a timetable for the progressive 
withdrawal of the balance of the U.S. 
forces in Vietnam at this time, both 
events to take place under the umbrella 
of a ceasefire which would bring, of 
course, an immediate end to all U.S. 
casualties. Something along these lines 
is within the scope of the President's 
October 7 statement. At the same time, 
the release of U.S. prisoners is within 
the scope of peace proposals which were 
made by North Vietnam on September 
17. 
This week, at the 95th session of the 
peace talks in Paris, Madam Nguyen Thi 
Binh repeated a previous proposal offer-
ing an immediate cease-fire in Vietnam 
In return for a declaration of United 
States and allied troop withdrawal by 
June 30, 1971. 
She also stated that U.S. acceptance 
of this proposal would mean immediate 
negotiations on the release of captured 
American prisoners. Madame Binh ig-
nored the U.S. proposal that meetings 
be held every day to try to bring about 
the release of all U.S. prisoners by Christ-
mas. 
· Shortly after that meeting concluded, 
Xuan Thuy, the chief of the North Viet-
namese delegation, noting that Ambas-
sador Bruce has rejected the proposal 
for a U.S. withdrawal by June 30, 1971, 
said : 
I , t herefore, propose that 1! the United 
States ls not wllllng to accept June 30, 1971 
as the dAt e !or final Withdrawal o! all lts 
troops, then lt should suggest another r eason-
able date. In that case, we can Immediat ely 
colls lder the American suggestion. 
At the 95th conference, Ambassador 
Bruce, after calling for "immediate ne-
gotiations on an internationally ·super-
vised ceasefire-in-place throughout all 
of Indochina," repeated the readiness of 
the United States to negotiate on an 
agreed timetable "for complete troop 
withdrawal as part of an overall settle-
ment in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." 
P erhaps in this give-and-take at Paris 
and also based in part on the President's 
proposals of October 7 and Hanoi's pro-
posals of Sept~mber 17, the two points 
to which reference is made-that is, the 
release of all U.S. prisoners of war cou-
pled to a timetable for the final with-
drawal of U.S. forces-might be explored 
exclusively-and I emphasize that word 
"exclusively" because that would mean 
setting these two issues apart--to see 
whether ' or not t hey may be reconciled 
as a starting point of a ceasefire to be 
followed by the negotiation of a complete 
settlemen t . It would be my hope, Mr. 
President, that this approach may light 
a clear signpost to peace. 
May I say that I submit these thoughts 
with an 1Ul.derstan ding and appreciation, 
I think, of the complexities and L'ltran-
sigences wh ich confron t the President. 
I submit them , nevertheless, in concern 
lest we find ourselves operating under a 
new fail-safe-deeper within this tragic 
involvementr-a new point of no return 
in Indochina. 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, would 
the distinguished Senator from Missouri 
(Mr. EAGLETON) yield briefiy to me, with-
out losing h is righ t to the fioor? 
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I am 
willing to yield for a brief period to the 
Senator from Michigan with the under-
standing that I do not lose my right to 
the fioor and that on resuming the fioor 
my remarks do not constitute a second 
speech. I do wan t to add that I have a 
gentleman's understanding with the 
Senator from Nevada <Mr. BIBLE) that 
after a not unseemly period he should be 
notified so he may come back and pro-
ceed on the DOT appropriation confer-
ence r eport. 
Mr. GRIFFIN. May I have 10 minutes? 
Mr. EAGLETON. May I inquire of the 
Chair h ow lon g we have been on matters 
unrelated to the DOT conference report? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifty-
eight minutes. 
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, would the 
Senator yield to me for 6 or 8 minutes? 
Mr. EAGLETON. I would be pleased to 
yield to any Senator who wants me to 
yield, but I feel under some moral obli-
gation to the manager of the conference 
report . 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
think the Senator from Missouri would 
be doin g the manager of the conference 
report a favor at this time by yielding. 
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, with 
those words of the majority leader , I 
shall yield first to the Senator from 
Michigan, then to the Senator from 
Rhode Island, and then to the Senator 
from Kansas. 
PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE 
PARIS TALKS 
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I lis-
tened with-close attention to the remarks 
of the distinguished majority leader, and 
I appreciate his reference to a proposal 
made earlier this week by the junior 
Senator from Michigan concerning pris-
oners of war. 
As I reported to the Senate earlier, I 
had a very interesting experience about 
a month ago when I met for over an 
hour with North Vietnam's Delegate 
General to France, Mr. Mai Van Bo. At 
that time I discussed with him some of 
the same matters which the distin-
guished majonty leader has discussed 
today. 
Unfortun.._ately, in her speech, Madam 
Binh, gave no indication that the Com-
munist side at the Paris talks would be 
willing to discuss the release of prisoners 
unless we first announce that all Ameri-
can troops will be out of South Vietnam 
by a given date. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. By June 30. 
Mr. GRIFFIN. By June 30. And, as the 
distinguished majority leader has point-
ed out very appropriately, P resident 
Nixon's proposal or initiative of October 
7 indicated that our side is r eady t o dis-
cuss the matter of a withdrawal time-
table. This is a matter wo are willing to 
discuss. But to be realistic we must keep 
in mind that the other side has refused 
to talk about the subjects. The other side 
refuses to discuss the release of prison-
ers. The other side refuses to discuss the 
matter of a timetable. Madam Binh has 
taken the position that her side will not 
even engage In discussions concerning 
the release of prisoners of war unless 
and until after we unilaterally announce 
that all troops wm be out by June 30. 
Hopefully, the other side may change 
its unreasonable position at some point. 
But, unfortunately, that is their position 
now, as I understand it. They will not 
even discuss the matter. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Presiden t, will 
the Senator yield at that point? 
Mr. GRIFFIN. I yield. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I tried to bring out 
in my speech a reference made by Xuan 
Thuy, the chief of the North Vietnamese 
delegation in Pru:is this week, at the 95th 
session, which goes beyond what Madam 
Binh has said, because the Senator's 
statement about Madam Binh was ab-
solutely correct. After that meeting, at 
which Madam Binh restated the old 
theme, "Withdraw by June 30, 1971, and 
then we wlll discuss the prisoners · of 
war," Xuan Thuy, chief of the North 
Vietnamese delegation, said: 
I, therefore, propose that lt the United 
States ls not wllllng to accept June 30, 1971, 
as the date tor final withdrawal o! a ll lt s 
troops, then it should suggest another rea-
sonable date. In that co.se, we can lmmcdl-
ately consider the American suggestion. ' 
So it appears to me there is a good deal 
of flexibility there, which may be tied in 
with the proposals made by the Presiden t 
on October 7 of this year, because I 
think the President's proposal had a 
great deal In the way of substance and 
a great amount of flexibility. 
Mr. GRIFFIN. I certainly would agree 
with the majority leader's description 
of the President's proposal. He proposed, 
for example, that all prisoners of war be 
released by both sides. · 
His other proposals were not neces-
sarily tied to each other. They could be 
considered as a whole, or in parts, or in 
groups related or unrelated, but there 
were no conditions. 
I hope that perhaps the majority lead-
er's interpretation of xuan Thuy's re-
mark m ay Indicate some greater de-
gree of flexibility than was the case be-
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The administration has indicated its sup-
port of such proposals. 
Furthermore, the distinguished deputy 
minority leader, the Senator from Michi-
gan <Mr. GRIFFIN), has advocated a pro-
pC'sal which likewise has the support of 
tt e administration, relative to the release 
of a certain number of prisoners of war 
h~ld in South Vietnam in the hope that it 
w6uld bring about reciprocal action by 
the North Vietnamese. 
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, may we have order? 
. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
~.te will be in order. 
Mr. MANSFIELP. Mr. President, the 
distinguished Senator from Kansas (Mr. 
DoLE) has been very active in behalf of 
the POW's-more active, perhaps, than 
anyone else In the Senate, with some ex-
·ceptions, and certain people in this 
country. 
The Senator from Kar..sas (Mr. DoLE) 
is to be commended for his unftagging 
and unfailing interest. 
It is the reporting by the Foreign Re-
lations Committee to the Senate of Sen-
ate Resolution 486, which was submitted 
by the distinguished Senator from Kan-
sas joined in by 30 or 40 Senators, and 
its adoption this morning, that I would 
like to use as a basis for the remarks 
which I am about to make, because my 
thesis has to do with the talks in Paris 
and their possible relations to negotia-
tions seeking to bring about a release of 
all the POW's held by North Vietnam at 
the present time. 
Mr. President, the President's policy 
in bringing about a steady reduction of 
forces in Vietnam has been commended, 
properly, many times on the ftoor of the 
Senate. The withdrawal is all to the good; 
it Is in the Interests of this Nation. The 
Senate has supported the progressive re-
duction; I have supported it, personally, 
expressing only the hope that the exodus 
might be speeded up. At the very least, 
it has seemed to me that nothing ought 
to be peimitted to Interfere in any way 
with the progressive reduction of U.S. 
forces, provided, of course, that the 
forces stlll remaining at any time are 
adequately safeguarded. -
I would hope, for example, that neither 
the words nor the actions of the execu-
tive branch or the Congress would delay 
in any way the departure of all Ameri-
can forces from Indochina because only 
a full withdrawal, in my judgment, can 
serve the vital interests of the United 
States. Only a full withdrawal will finally 
end all Ameiican casualties which Is, af-
ter all, a fundamental of present policy, 
as I understand lt. I repeat, Mr. Presi-
dent, not some but all American casual-
ties must be ended as soon as possible. 
There Is not and cannot be a tolerable 
level of American casualties In a misbe-
gotten war. 
So once more, let me say that the Pres-
Ident is to be commended for hewing to 
his policy of continuing to draw down 
U.S. forces and for exceeding the target 
figure of reduction which he had estab-
lished for this point in time. It is no mean 
achievement to move the machinery of 
the executive branch to bring about a 
shift of this kind. Notwithstanding, I 
must note, 1n all candor, that we are far 
from out of the jungle in Indochina. 
To sense how tightly we continue to be 
ensnared, we had better look most care-
fully not only to the U.S. forces remain-
ing in V.ietnam-there are almost 350,000 
still there-well below the total of almost 
550,000 2 years ago-but also to the con-
tingents of U.S. personnel in Laos and 
Thailand. We had better look, too, to U.S. 
military activities other than ground ac-
tion, whether air bombardments, naval 
engagements, or whatever, which are still 
taking place throughout the Indochinese 
peninsula. We should note, also the ex-
panding area of military action in which 
our forces-be they on the ground, in the 
air, or on the sea--are engaged. A U.S. 
serviceman is no less a casualty if he is 
killed when his helicopter strikes a moun-
tain in Laos or his plane is shot down 
while flying close support for a Vietnam-
ese battalion in Cambodia than when he 
is shattered by a bobbytrap outside 
Saigon. 
We had better take a look, too, at the 
degree to which we continue to assume 
and to increase--not only by our acts but 
by our words-U.S. responsibilities for 
the survival of governments in the cap-
itals of all three Indochinese countries. 
Finally, we will gage more accurately 
the distance yet to go in ending this in-
volvement by noting the lack of progress 
in the meetings in Parts. 
I regret to have to say it but I must 
say It most soberly-by any of these 
other measures there are no indications 
of an end in sight to the involvement in 
Indochina. I do not see that the scope of 
that involvemerit has even shrunk In the 
past year or so, with the significant ex-
ception already noted of the tactical cur-
tailment of the use of U.S. forces, air, 
sea, and ground. 
We may well ask ourselves, for ex-
ample, what Is changed in our relation-
ship with the Saigon government? What 
is its life expectancy without a continued 
powerful U.S . military presence, not to 
speak of a steady flow of massive U.S. 
aid? What of the Government in Laos? 
Does it stand closer to survival as a neu-
tral or in any other independent way, 
now that many Americans are engaged 
there and the dollars flood into that 
country? Is there a cutoff of either U.S. 
casualties 9r aid in sight? When can the 
withdrawal of the American contingents 
be expected? What of the related aid and 
contingents with regard to Thailand? 
Then there is Cambodia. This time last 
year there were perhaps 11 Americans 
In a miniscule diplomatic mission and 
no aid program of any kind. Hostile 
forces were present only along the Cam-
bodian-Vietnamese borders. No Ameri-
cans were involved anywhere in Cambo-
dia. No U.S. casualties of any kind were 
being incurred ·in that country. To be 
sure, there was a government 1n Phnom 
Penh with only a fingertip grip on neu-
trality. Some considered that govern-
ment not to be very friendly to the 
United States and, Indeed, in its public 
utterances frequently it was not. 
Now there is a government which seems 
more friendly to the United States. How-
ever, that government's hold on the coun-
try is dubious, even a few miles outside 
the capital city In any direction. North 
Vietnamese forces are no longer concen-
tz·ated in the border sanctuaries but to-
gether with Cambodian guerrilla forces, 
they have spread in reinforced strength 
over one-half to three-quarters of 
Cambodia. 
The staff of (1 Americans at the U.S. 
mission in Phnom Penh a year ago has 
burgeoned to 60 a t present and it is still 
growing. The executive branch on its 
own has already funneled through that 
mission a commitment of $105 million to 
the new Government of Cambodia. It has 
asked the Congress not only to under-
write that commitment, but to join in 
committing another $155 million, a step 
which the Senate on Wednesday last said 
that it was prepared to take. I would be 
less than honest if I did not express my 
concern at that decision although I bow, 
of course, to the collective wisdom of 
the Senate. 
It should be noted that the request 
was made under a familiar slogan: 
"spending dollars is better than spending 
lives." Of course, it is better to spend 
dollars; who would disagree with that 
order of priority? But is the evaluation 
valid? 
Before we travel much further down 
that road, we had better note that the 
same slogan marked the beginning of the 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam as well as 
in Laos. Since then, we have scattered . 
over a hundred billion dollars of the 
people's tnxes along that slippery road. 
Far more tragic, a total of over 53,000 
American lives have ended and over 
290,000 others have suffered wounds on 
that tragic trail. In short, the accurate 
evaluation in Indochina is not to be 
found in the slogan: "better to spend 
money than lives." No, Mr. President, if 
we must use slogans, the more appro-
priate phrase in Indochina would appear 
to be "aid-money first and lives later." 
That has been the pattern to date. 
We may ask ourselves, too, whether our 
involvement in Indochina Is shrinking or 
growing when we perceive that the air-
war has long since been extended from 
Vietnam to all of Laos and appears, now, 
to be on the verge of an extension to all 
of Cambodia. Moreover, what began as 
an understandable sympathy for the 
1,500 Americans who are believed to be 
prisoners of Hanoi has given rise to words 
· and actions, in multiplying indication 
that the area of our military involve-
ment may well be expanding still further 
to reembrace bombing raids over North 
Vietnam. It will be recalled that it was 
the bombing of the North which led 
originally to the deaths of many Ameri-
can airmen and the capture of almost 
all of the Americans whom we now seek 
to free from the prison camps of North 
Vietnam. The raids were curtailed under 
the previous administration and this 
wastage of American lives was, at last, 
halted. Are we now about to begin it all 
over again? 
Finally, if we would measare the dis-
tance to the end of our involvement we 
should take into consideration what is 
transpiring in the Paris talks. The over-
whelming fact, there, is that, w1tU now, 
there was libtle worth mentioning. The 
talks are back almost to the beginning 
of a beginning. Two years later, tl:}e>y are 
as far from bonafide negotiation" as they 
have ever been. 
All 1n all, then, we would be well ad-
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